threat-intelligence 7 min read
Scattered Spider: an actor profile built from open sources
| Product | Actor profile |
| Handling | TLP:CLEAR — open sources only |
| Version | 2.2 (2026-10-28) |
| Review trigger | New government advisory, MITRE ATT&CK update, vendor re-assessment, or law-enforcement action |
| Next review | 2027-04-30 |
| Author | Martín Eliseo |
Every claim below carries a source and is graded on two independent axes. Where vendors disagree, I say so.
How to read this
Two axes are graded separately, per claim — not per section:
- Confidence — how good the sourcing and the reasoning are: High (corroborated by two or more independent authoritative sources), Moderate (one credible source, or corroboration with gaps), Low (single-source, self-claimed, or heavily inferential).
- Probability — how likely the assessed outcome is, stated only where the claim is estimative: nearly certain, very likely, likely, roughly even chance, unlikely, very unlikely.
They are not the same thing. A claim can be very likely at low confidence (a single source) or roughly even at high confidence (strong data, genuine uncertainty). Purely factual claims are graded for confidence only and carry n/a for probability. Unverified means it could not be substantiated, and is recorded so it is not repeated as fact.
Bottom line
Scattered Spider is a native-English-speaking, financially motivated intrusion set active since at least 2022 whose primary attack surface is people and identity, not software. Its signature is impersonating IT and help-desk staff to reset passwords and move MFA tokens, then abusing legitimate remote-monitoring tools and cloud identity to hold an enterprise from the inside. Since 2024 it has added hypervisor-level (VMware vSphere/ESXi) operations and ransomware to a data-extortion playbook, and in 2025 a self-branded coalition — “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” — ran a large voice-phishing and OAuth-theft campaign against SaaS (Salesforce) tenants. Law-enforcement arrests in 2025 slowed the activity without stopping it.
1. Identity and naming
The same activity is tracked under several designations:
| Designation | Attributed to |
|---|---|
| Scattered Spider (early phase: Roasted 0ktapus) | CrowdStrike |
| UNC3944 | Mandiant / Google Threat Intelligence |
| Octo Tempest, Storm-0875 | Microsoft |
| Muddled Libra | Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 |
| 0ktapus | Group-IB |
| Scatter Swine | Okta |
| G1015 | MITRE ATT&CK |
CISA lists “UNC3944, Scatter Swine, Oktapus, Octo Tempest, Storm-0875, and Muddled Libra” as aliases of Scattered Spider [1]; MITRE records them as Associated Groups [2], which is explicitly weaker than “same actor”.
Caveat — low confidence. These designations are not universally treated as co-referential. Public analysis notes that the shared 0ktapus phishing kit was reused by multiple actors, and some vendor assessments go as far as treating Muddled Libra as a distinct cluster despite overlapping tradecraft. Read the aliases as an overlapping cluster, not a verified single identity [2][9].
2. Assessment ledger
| Assessment | Confidence | Probability | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Native-English-speaking, active since at least 2022 | Moderate | n/a | [2] |
| Initial access via help-desk vishing and MFA bypass (push bombing, SIM swap) | Moderate | n/a | [1][2] |
| Abuse of legitimate RMM tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, Tailscale, Teleport.sh) | Moderate | n/a | [1] |
| Registers its own MFA tokens and historically adds a federated IdP to the SSO tenant | Moderate | n/a | [1] |
| Hypervisor (vCenter/ESXi) operations | High | n/a | [2][3] |
| Ransomware: BlackCat, and DragonForce from 2025 | Moderate | n/a | [1][2] |
| Sector wave targeting (retail, insurance, airlines) | Moderate | likely | [3][4] |
| 2025 arrests slowed the group | Moderate | likely | [5] |
| Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters is Scattered Spider plus Lapsus$ plus ShinyHunters | Low | roughly even chance | [6][7][8] |
| The ~1 billion-record Salesforce claim | Low | unlikely | [6][7] |
3. Tradecraft
Initial access — the help desk is the perimeter. Voice phishing (vishing) impersonating IT or
help-desk staff — or employees impersonating staff — to get passwords reset and MFA tokens
transferred, frequently across several calls (“layered social engineering”); MFA push bombing (MFA
fatigue); SIM swap to intercept one-time codes; and purchased credentials from criminal marketplaces,
including abuse of contracted third-party IT help desks. Lookalike domains mirror the target
(<target>-helpdesk.com, <target>-okta.com, <target>-servicedesk.com) [1][2].
Identity persistence and privilege. The actor registers its own MFA tokens and, historically, adds a federated identity provider to the SSO tenant and enables automatic account linking — allowing sign-in even after a password reset. It also modifies conditional-access policies and creates new identities to survive response [1][2].
Cloud and hypervisor. It enumerates and abuses Okta, AWS, and Microsoft Entra ID, uses AWS Systems Manager Inventory for discovery, and creates cloud instances for lateral movement and staging [1][2]. The 2025 pivot is notable: compromise of vSphere (vCenter Server), reboot into single-user mode, deployment of Teleport for covert access, mounting domain-controller disks via “orphaned” VMs, disabling backups, and running ransomware from the ESXi shell — which renders in-guest security tooling ineffective [3].
Discovery, collection, exfiltration. It searches SharePoint, code repositories, credential-storage documents, VPN/MFA enrollment guides and new-hire guides; reads Slack, Teams and Exchange for conversations about the intrusion and the response; and — reported repeatedly — joins incident-response calls to learn how defenders are hunting it [1][2]. Exfiltration targets include MEGA, AWS S3, and Snowflake for mass extraction [1].
Impact. Dual extortion: data theft with the threat to leak it, plus encryption (BlackCat historically; DragonForce in 2025, encrypting ESXi servers) [1][2].
4. Targeting
Initially CRM providers, business-process outsourcing, telecom and technology; from 2023 gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing and financial [2]. In 2025, a concentrated wave against UK retail and — per Google — US retail, airline and insurance [3][4].
5. The “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” branding (2025) — low confidence
A group self-branded Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters (also “Trinity of Chaos”), claiming to combine Scattered Spider, Lapsus$ and ShinyHunters, ran a large campaign against Salesforce customers using voice phishing and malicious OAuth applications — including abuse of Salesloft Drift tokens — with claims reaching approximately one billion records across dozens of named organisations. Google tracks related activity as UNC6040/UNC6395 and the FBI issued an advisory. Attribution rests largely on actor self-claims plus TTP overlap; analysts caution the relationship may be a shared criminal community rather than a single merged entity, and Salesforce disputes that its platform was compromised. Treat this as context on a brand, not a confirmed organisational structure [6][7][8].
6. Disruption and current status
Arrests and guilty pleas in 2024–2026 prompted reporting in mid-2025 that UNC3944 activity had “gone quiet”, followed by continued or rebranded activity. Assessment: degraded, not dismantled [5].
7. What this means for defenders
Adapted from CISA’s mitigations [1], ordered by how directly they attack this actor’s playbook:
- Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn). This single control removes push bombing and SIM swap from the board.
- Help-desk verification. Out-of-band identity checks for password resets, no MFA-token transfer over the phone, and alerting on reset-then-reenrolment bursts.
- Control remote access tools. Allowlist execution and alert on portable RMM binaries.
- Harden the hypervisor. No direct ESXi shell access, isolated/immutable backups, and monitoring of vCenter SSO and new admin roles.
- Watch the identity control plane. New federated IdPs, new trusted locations, and new MFA device registrations are high-signal events here.
- Offline, tested backups. The last line, and the one this actor specifically targets.
8. Detection opportunities
What to look for, not a validated ruleset (consistent with the rule-provenance policy I use elsewhere):
- A help-desk password reset followed within a short window by MFA re-registration for the same identity.
- A new federated identity provider or trusted location added to the IdP tenant.
- Portable RMM binaries running from user-writable paths, and their network beaconing.
- On vSphere: changes to the
ESX Adminsgroup, vCenter single-user-mode reboots, and Teleport service units.
9. Intelligence gaps and what I could not verify
- The exact structure and membership of “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” — one entity, or a brand over a community.
- Victim counts (actor claims, disputed by at least one platform vendor).
- The precise boundary between Scattered Spider, UNC3944 and Muddled Libra remains contested.
- Nothing here is validated against private telemetry, and I did not analyse malware samples for this profile. This is an open-source assessment, and it is bounded by that.
10. Outlook — what would change this judgement
The confidence above is a snapshot; these events would move it:
- A new or revised advisory (CISA AA23-320A, or MITRE ATT&CK group G1015) that merges the alias cluster or splits it — the single strongest lever on the naming judgement.
- Vendor reporting that resolves Muddled Libra as the same actor or as a distinct cluster.
- Attribution of “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” beyond actor self-claims and TTP overlap.
- Evidence the ESXi/ransomware playbook has changed (a new encryptor, or new hypervisor tradecraft).
Sources
- CISA, FBI, RCMP, ASD/ACSC, AFP, CCCS, NCSC-UK — Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-320A: Scattered Spider (last revised 29 Jul 2025). https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a
- MITRE ATT&CK — Group G1015: Scattered Spider (v3.0, last modified 31 Jul 2026). https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015
- Google Threat Intelligence Group — Defending vSphere from UNC3944 (summarised by Infosecurity Magazine, 28 Jul 2025). https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defending-vsphere-from-unc3944
- Google/GTIG via Computer Weekly — Scattered Spider retail attacks spreading to US (14 May 2025). https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366623999/Scattered-Spider-retail-attacks-spreading-to-US-says-Google
- Infosecurity Magazine — Cybercriminals ‘Spooked’ After Scattered Spider Arrests (31 Jul 2025). https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cybercriminals-spooked-scattered
- BleepingComputer — ShinyHunters launches Salesforce data leak site to extort 39 victims (3 Oct 2025). https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-starts-leaking-data-stolen-in-salesforce-attacks
- SC Media — New Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters escalates Salesforce extortion (6 Oct 2025). https://www.scworld.com/brief/new-scattered-lapsus-hunters-escalates-salesforce-extortion
- Computer Weekly — ShinyHunters Salesforce cyber attacks explained (11 Aug 2025). https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/ShinyHunters-Salesforce-cyber-attacks-explained-What-you-need-to-know
- Vendor tracking names and the non-equivalence caveat, as reported in public actor-profile aggregations (secondary source; treated as low confidence).
All analysis is open-source. Views are my own.
Revision history
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2026-10-06 | First release. |
| 2.0 | 2026-10-09 | Split confidence and probability into two axes; added the product header, the outlook and this history. No assessed fact changed. |
| 2.1 | 2026-10-28 | Handling corrected from the retired TLP 1.0 label to TLP:CLEAR (TLP 2.0), now checked in CI. No assessed fact changed. |
| 2.2 | 2026-10-28 | Grades now computed from the claim registry. Five High became Moderate: MITRE G1015 derives from the CISA-led advisory, and several rows rested on one source. The facts are unchanged; the confidence was overstated. |